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INTRODUCTION
“Cloud
computing,”
an
amorphous
and
often
misunderstood
term,
references
an
Internet-based
methodology that service providers and web-based entities
commonly use. The majority of Internet users unknowingly
encounter cloud computing in their casual day-to-day web
browsing. So-called “Web 2.0 applications,” such as Gmail,
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Facebook, and LinkedIn, all utilize cloud computing. In a
nutshell, all processing and data retention occurs away from
the user’s computer, in a cloud computing application at a
service provider’s remote location.
More and more companies are taking advantage of cloud
computing services offered by providers such as Amazon,
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!.1 These cloud computing
service providers allow companies to replace their expensive
and aging technological infrastructure with third-party
processing and storage capabilities that are accessible over
the Internet.2 Not only does this option save on overhead and
infrastructure costs, but the cloud computing service
providers also offer flexible pricing on a pay-for-use basis that
offers attractive scalability.3 This service permits easy access
over the Internet or over a private network from any location,
so that computer software and data may be readily available
whenever and wherever.4
There are three basic types of cloud computing services:
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as a Service
(SaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS).5 There are also
four models for deployment of these services: private, public,
community, and hybrid.6 This Comment focuses exclusively
upon private SaaS cloud services because they are the most
commonly used type and model.
Private SaaS clouds permit access to a provider’s
software applications running on cloud infrastructure
maintained for the benefit of a solitary enterprise.7 The
enterprise contracts with the provider to supply it with
solutions to its particular business needs, such as data
retention or remote database access.
These solutions,
contained entirely in the cloud, are considered private
because the solutions are only accessible by the enterprise
that is paying for the provider’s services.

1. Mark L. Austrian & W. Michael Ryan, Cloud Computing Meets EDiscovery, CYBERSPACE LAW., July 2009, at 1.
2. See id.
3. W. Michael Ryan & Cristopher M. Loeffler, Insights into Cloud
Computing, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 22, 22 (2010).
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 22–23.
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As more companies incorporate cloud computing into
their day-to-day activities, their data accumulates in the
cloud. Where this electronically stored information (ESI)
goes, electronic discovery often soon follows.8 A company that
becomes involved in litigation may thereafter be required to
produce some of the data that is stored in the cloud by the
service provider.
Requests for the production of ESI can come in the form
of a Rule 34 motion to compel production9 or a Rule 45
subpoena directing a third-party service provider to produce
ESI.10 It would be prudent for companies to take preemptory
measures to ensure that their third-party cloud computing
service provider does not engage in spoliation, or the deletion,
of ESI. Otherwise, a company involved in litigation may be
subjected to sanctions for the deletion of ESI by its thirdparty service provider.11
Part I.A will address the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) applicable to electronic discovery.12 Part I.B will
discuss the application of the three elements of the Zubulake
IV framework to ESI in the cloud, which provide a starting
point for the mitigation of liability for discovery sanctions.13
Finally, Part II will discuss how a company can reduce its
liability by inserting protective electronic-discovery-specific
provisions into the service agreement with its third-party
cloud computing service provider.14
I.

ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE CLOUD

With the relatively new introduction of electronic
discovery procedures, by way of the 2006 Amendments to the
FRCP, case law is still fleshing out and adapting the
electronic discovery procedures with respect to today’s

8. David D. Cross & Emily Kuwahara, E-Discovery and Cloud Computing:
Control of ESI in the Cloud, EDDE J., Spring 2010, at 2.
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
11. See, e.g., Bowman v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-7871, 1998 WL
721079, *4 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 9, 1998) (holding that a prosthetic implant
production company was held liable for spoliation of evidence in a product
liability suit even though such evidence was throw out by a third-party doctor).
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part II.
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technologies.15 To add further uncertainty, companies are
rapidly employing the use of third-party cloud computing
data processing and retention services—an unexplored
territory of jurisprudence.16 Given the lack of jurisprudence
in applying the electronic discovery rules to third parties, it is
difficult to predict the outcome of electronic discovery
disputes.
Parties involved in litigation may stretch to draw
comparisons between past cases concerning tangible data
held by third-parties and present scenarios where intangible
data is held by a third-party cloud computing service
provider.17 But, the amount of administerial power held by
the third-party cloud computing service provider over ESI is
too dissimilar to draw a valid comparison.18 For example, the
third-party cloud computing service provider has more control
than an average third-party maintaining paper copies of data,
because the third-party cloud computing service provider is
contracted to replace a company’s existing data retention and
processing infrastructure. In addition, the third-party cloud
computing service provider may exercise its ability to alter or
destroy the company’s data subject to the service provider’s
routine deletion procedures.19
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Applicable to Electronic
Discovery
The 2006 Amendments20 to the FRCP21 paved the way for
15. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 3.
16. See Oregon v. Beller, 217 P.3d 1094, 1111 n.11 (Or. Ct. App. 2009)
(Sercombe, J., dissenting). This is the only judicial opinion that expressly
mentions cloud computing, and, even then, it is only mentioned in a footnote.
17. See generally Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 354 (E.D. Mich.
2008); In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., 245 F.R.D. 474, 477 (D. Colo. 2007).
18. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 5.
19. The safe harbor provision in Rule 37 may shield third parties from
routine, good-faith deletion of ESI. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
20. 2006 FRCP amendments applicable to this comment chiefly include
those to Rules 26, 34, 37, and 45.
21. A discovery conference in 1996 first addressed the unique problems
associated with the discovery of electronically stored information. Judicial
Conf. of the U.S., Summary Rep. of the Comm. on the FED. R. CIV. P. app. C, at
18, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rule/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2011). After the Advisory Comm.’s comment, published Aug.
2004, and three public hearings the Advisory Comm. submitted their newly
revised proposed amendments to the Standing Comm. Id. After approval by
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It is
today’s complex electronic discovery procedures.22
worthwhile to take a closer look at the rules’ functions in
order to determine how cloud computing service providers
may fit into the overall procedural scheme.
Of vital importance to the 2006 Amendments, Rule
26(a)(1)(A) lays the groundwork for the practice of electronic
discovery, stating that:
[A] party must without awaiting a discovery request,
provide to other parties: . . . (ii) a copy – or a description by
category and location – of all documents, electronically
stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing
party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use
to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be
solely for impeachment.23

Although electronically stored information may be
voluntarily produced under Rule 26(a), a party may also
obtain ESI in other ways. One of these ways for a party
seeking ESI is to draft a motion to compel the discovery of
ESI,24 within the scope prescribed by Rule 26(b), on an
opposing party.25 For instance, the plaintiff in Zubulake IV
filed a motion to compel the production of e-mails in a sex
discrimination suit.26 In order to compel production in this

the Standing Comm., the Judicial Conf. approved the proposed amendments on
Sept. 20, 2005. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S. 37 (2005). However, they are considered the 2006
amendments to the FRCP because that is the year they went into effect.
22. See Tanya L. Forsheit, E-Discovery Involving Cloud Facilities, 1010
PLI/PAT 157, 159–68 (2010).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of
Rule 26(b) to produce and permit the requesting party or its
representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in
the responding party’s possession, custody, or control: any designated
documents or electronically stored information . . . stored in any
medium from which information can be obtained either directly . . . .
Id.
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for
a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show
that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost.
Id.
26. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212,
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manner, the moving party must specify the form of
production for the ESI.27 In the absence of such a stipulation
or court order, with respect to the form of production, a
producing party must produce ESI in the form in which it is
ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form.28 In
addition to the two mechanisms described above, a party may
subpoena a non-party service provider to produce ESI
pursuant to Rule 45.29 For example, in Flagg, the plaintiff
subpoenaed the defendant-city’s text messaging provider for
production of text messages concerning an alleged murder.30
Yet, there are two exceptions that may enable the court
to deny a requesting party’s motion to compel the production
of ESI. ESI need not be produced in the two following
situations: (1) if the ESI is not readily accessible due to undue
burden or cost;31 or (2) if the balance between the ESI’s
benefit and its evidentiary importance or production expense
weighs against the moving party.32 Rule 26 also grants the

215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1) (“The request must describe with reasonable
particularity each item or category to be inspected; must specify a reasonable
time, place, and manner for the inspection and for performing related acts; and
may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be
produced.”); see, e.g., Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169 (D. Del. 2006).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, these procedures
apply to producing documents or electronically stored information: A
party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of
business . . . ; if a request does not specify a form for producing
electronically stored information, a party must produce it in a form or
forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable
form or forms . . . .
Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan.
2005).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(D) (“A command in a subpoena to produce a
document, electronically stored information, or tangible things requires the
responding party to permit inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of the
materials.”).
30. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of
discovery . . . if it determines that . . . the burden of expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of
the discovery in resolving the issues.
Id.
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trial court substantial latitude in deciding whether a
discovery request constitutes an undue burden that would
justify not producing the requested ESI.33 Lastly, Rule 37
includes a safe harbor provision that may shield the nonmoving party from the imposition of sanctions for failing to
produce ESI, if the requested ESI has been lost as a result of
the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information
system.34
B. Application of the Zubulake IV Framework to the
Spoliation of ESI in the Cloud
It is essentially Judge Scheindlin’s opinion in Zubulake
IV that created a framework for analyzing the spoliation of
electronically stored information.35 The Judiciary Committee
borrowed heavily from Scheindlin’s framework to draft the
2006 Amendments to the FRCP, which are discussed above.36
In Zubulake IV,37 the plaintiff, a former equities trader
for UBS, filed a complaint against UBS for gender
discrimination for failure to promote and retaliation.38
During the discovery process, the plaintiff requested e-mail
correspondence sent between various UBS employees that
were exclusively stored on UBS’ proprietary computer
systems.39 Due to UBS’ failure to preserve the e-mail
correspondence, the plaintiff sought to impose discovery
sanctions against UBS.40 The court, in rendering its opinion,
created an analytical framework for the party seeking to
33. Erin Marie Secord, Exploring Challenges with the Discovery of Text
Messages in Federal Cases Through the Lens of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Stored Communications Act, 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADOV. 143, 146 (2010).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system.”).
35. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 9–10.
36. See Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing
Vulnerability of Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 15 (2006)
(maintaining that the “series of rulings by Judge Scheindlin in the Zubulake
litigation have shaped the contours of electronic discovery and provide an
example of how electronic discovery issues emerge within litigation”).
37. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 215.
40. See id.
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impose sanctions for spoliation, or the deletion, of evidence.41
The framework provides that the seeker must establish the
following three elements, in order to prevail on such a motion:
(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an
obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed;
(2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of
mind; and
(3) that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s
claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could
find that it would support that claim or defense. 42

In order to avoid falling victim to situations similar to
UBS’, a company contemplating entering into a contract, or
currently in a contract, with a third-party cloud computing
service provider should consider, and incorporate, safeguard
provisions in their service contract as well as enact
accompanying company policies to avoid sanctions for the
spoliation, or deletion of ESI.
1. Mitigating Liability Under Prong I of the Zubulake
IV Framework
Under the first element of the Zubulake IV analysis, a
company should not fear the imposition of sanctions, unless
“the party having control over the evidence had an obligation
to preserve it at the time it was destroyed.”43 This element
also implicates a series of secondary considerations, including
(a) the date on which the duty to preserve is triggered, (b) the
scope of the duty to preserve, which includes the key players
in litigation and the lifeline of ESI, and (c) the format in
which the ESI is to be produced. Finally, the party, upon
which a production request is placed, must, in fact, (d) have
necessary possession, custody, or control of the ESI.
i.

Trigger Date for a Litigation Hold

Generally, “[t]he duty to preserve material evidence
arises not only during litigation but also extends to that
period before the litigation when a party reasonably should
know that the evidence may be relevant to the anticipated

41. See id. at 220.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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litigation.”44 Other circuit courts, however, require more
certainty as to whether litigation is likely before the duty to
preserve arises, whereby “litigation must be probable rather
than a [mere] possibility, and the path to litigation must be
clear and immediate.”45 Yet, some circuit courts construe
anticipation more broadly whereby the litigation hold is
triggered when the defendant corporation retained counsel in
connection with legal action but had yet to identify an
allegedly responsible party.46 In light of the uncertainty of
the split among circuit courts apropos, the trigger of a
litigation hold, the best practice and a “helpful analytical tool
[for determining when the duty to preserve attaches] is the
more widely developed standard for anticipation of litigation
under the work product doctrine.”47 Work product doctrine
protection attaches to documents “prepared because of the
prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual or a
potential claim following an actual event or series of events
that reasonably could result in litigation.”48
The simplest measure to prevent the imposition of
sanctions is a company’s ability to quickly put a litigation
hold into place. The company needs to be able to implement a
litigation hold on data retained by their third-party cloud
computing service provider once they reasonably anticipate
litigation,49 subject to several small wrinkles in different
44. Id. at 216 n.13 (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d
Cir. 1999)).
45. Hynix Semicond., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1062 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (holding that litigation must be probable, rather than a possibility
and the path to litigation must be clear and immediate before the duty to
preserve arises); see, e.g., Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc.,
244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D. Colo. 2007) (stating that “[w]hile a party shouldn’t be
permitted to destroy potential evidence after receiving unequivocal notice of
impending litigation, the duty to preserve relevant documents should require
more than a mere possibility of litigation.”); Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D.
363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the mere existence of a dispute does not
necessarily mean that parties should reasonably anticipate litigation or that the
duty to preserve arises).
46. Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 340 (D.
Conn. 2009).
47. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 524, 542 (E.D. Va.
2006).
48. Id. (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d
980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992).
49. See Samsung Elecs. Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d at 542. The best practice for
determining the trigger date for a litigation hold should be the more widely
developed standard for anticipation of litigation under the work product
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This may be accomplished by
circuits’ jurisprudence.50
contracting for the right, in a company’s service agreement
with a third-party cloud computing service provider, to stop
the routine destruction of data at the discretion of the
company’s general counsel or officer. If ESI is preserved in
the first instance, there is no need to advance to the second
and third prongs of the Zubulake IV analysis because the last
two prongs require ESI to be destroyed.
ii. Scope of the Duty to Preserve ESI
The duty to preserve ESI does not apply to every
document a company has ever created, or will create.
Instead, “[a] party or anticipated party must retain all
relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies) in
existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches, and any
relevant documents created thereafter.”51 For example, an email correspondence drafted by a supervisor concerning an
employee’s performance review for a promotion in an
employment discrimination case would be subject to the duty
to preserve.52
This, however, does not mean that a
corporation, upon recognizing a threat of litigation, must
preserve every shred of paper or every file of ESI, because
such a stringent rule would serve to cripple large corporations
that produce voluminous amounts of ESI and are frequently
engaged involved in litigation.53
The duty to preserve is not so draconian; on the contrary,
it extends only to “individuals likely to have discoverable
information that the disclosing party may use to support its
claims and defenses.”54 Thus, the duty covers persons “likely
to have relevant information—the ‘key players’ in the case.”55
The scope of discovery of the preservation duty is further
restricted by the accessibility of the ESI in its current

doctrine.
50. See generally supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
51. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
52. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 312–
13 (S.D.N.Y 2003); see also Bellinger v. Astrue, CV-06-321 (CBA), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71727, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009).
53. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217.
54. Id. at 218.
55. Id.
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condition.56 In Zubulake I, five categories of data were
described from the most to the least accessible:
(1) Active, online data: data generally stored on magnetic
disk that is used in the very active stages of an electronic
record’s life (e.g., data on hard drives);
(2) Near-line data: data stored on a robotic storage device
that houses removable media (e.g., optical disks);
(3) Offline storage/archives: data on removable optical disk
or magnetic tape media traditionally used for making
disaster copies of records and also for records considered
archival;
(4) Backup tapes: a device, like a tape recorder, that reads
data from and writes it onto a tape; and
(5) Erased, fragmented or damaged data: as files are
erased, their previous contiguous clusters are made
available again as free space and the broken up files are
randomly placed throughout the disk.57

Although this is a somewhat dated description of the
categories within the lifeline of digital information, it still
serves as a guidepost for the accessibility of ESI as it evolves
from primary to archival data.58 However, since it generally
takes the law some time to catch up with and adapt to
technology, the lifeline of ESI, as it shifts from a readily
accessible active format to inaccessible data, presents a
continuing challenge to the scope of the duty to preserve.59
Since the scope of the duty to preserve, triggered by
anticipated or ongoing litigation, is determined largely upon
who has accumulated and retained data in the cloud, it is
imperative for a company to be able to quickly identify the
relevant key players involved in the corresponding litigation
when implementing a litigation hold. This objective may be
realized if the company inserts flexibility into their service
agreement with their third-party cloud computing service
provider. Such flexibility would require the company to be
able to easily access and place a non-deletion hold on a key
player’s ESI that is stored in the cloud by a simple search

56.
57.
58.
59.

Crist, supra note 36, at 30.
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319.
See Crist, supra note 36, at 26.
Id.
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function. The ability to identify key players in order to
implement a litigation hold may be further achieved by
integrating a clause into the service agreement, employment
contracts, and company handbooks, that enables the
company’s general counsel, or specified officer, to exercise
discretion over placing a litigation hold on any employee,
considered a key player to the anticipated or ongoing
litigation, and who has or continues to use of the service
provider’s cloud computing applications.
The scope of a key players’ ESI that must be preserved
includes “all relevant documents (but not multiple identical
copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches,
and any relevant documents created thereafter.”60
A
company’s service agreement with their third-party cloud
computing service provider must therefore articulate a
certain amount of flexibility in order to effectuate the
company’s ability to retrieve the proper documents and to
adapt to the corresponding suit they are engaged in because
no two cases will require the same suite of ESI to be produced
to a requesting party.
Compliance with the scope of the duty to preserve may
also be achieved in a manner that is similar to selecting
which employees’ ESI to preserve. The company should
contract for, in the service agreement with their third-party
cloud computing service provider, the right to retrieve and
preserve certain types of documents relevant to the
anticipated or ongoing litigation in an easily searchable and
definable manner. The service agreement should state that
this right remains at the discretion of the company’s general
counsel, or a specified officer similarly equipped with the
authority and competence to make such a determination.
iii. Format for the Production of ESI
A company that employs a third-party cloud computing
service provider needs to be mindful of the format in which it
may be compelled to produce ESI in future litigation when
drafting its service agreement. Generally, a party that
produces documents for inspection shall, pursuant to Rule 34,
produce them as they are kept in the usual course of business
or shall organize and label them to correspond with the
60. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218.

YSMITH FINAL

2012]

11/14/2012 1:01 AM

ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

1573

categories in the request.61 Rule 34, in turn, raises issues
such as whether the ESI should be produced with
“metadata”—which is defined as data about the data62—and
whether the ESI should be produced in its native file format
or some other format.63
In determining whether metadata should be produced
under a Rule 34 request, the court in Williams v.
Sprint/United Management Co.64 faced a question of first
impression and looked to the Sedona Principles for
guidance.65
The party seeking ESI requested that
spreadsheets be produced with their original metadata intact,
instead of being produced in a TIFF image format.66 The
court agreed with the requesting party by reasoning that in
light of emerging standards, “the producing party should
produce the electronic documents with their metadata intact,
unless the party timely objects to production of the metadata,
the parties agree that the metadata should not be produced,
or the producing party requests a protective order.”67 The
initial burden, with regard to disclosure of metadata, is thus
placed on the producing party.68

61. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
62. Adam K. Israel, To Scrub or Not to Scrub: The Ethical Implications of
Metadata and Electronic Data Creation, Exchange, and Discovery, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 469, 469 (2009). “As a general rule of thumb, the more interactive the
application, the more important the metadata is to understanding the
application’s output.” Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 647
(D. Kan. 2005). The basic metadata characteristics can show whether a
document has been inadvertently or intentionally modified, thereby performing
a crucial function in establishing whether a document is genuine. See Philip J.
Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining
Metadata, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 12 (2007).
63. This will depend on both the Circuit the litigation is taking place and
also whether the requesting party stipulates as to which file format the ESI
should be produced. See infra notes 64, 69, 71 and accompanying text.
64. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652.
65. Comment 9.a of The Sedona Principles uses viewability as the
determining factor in whether something should be presumptively treated as a
part of a “document.”
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PRODUCTION 30 (2003). Using viewability as the standard, all metadata
ordinarily visible to the user of the Excel spreadsheet application should
presumptively be treated as part of the “document” and should thus be
discoverable. See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652.
66. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 643.
67. Id. at 652.
68. Id.
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Metadata was not discoverable in Wyeth v. Impax
Laboratories, Inc., because the court determined that the
parties had never agreed that electronic documents would be
produced in any particular format; therefore, Wyeth had
complied with its discovery obligations by producing the ESI
Impax, furthermore, had not
as TIFF image files.69
demonstrated a particularized need for the metadata.70 On
the other hand, requesting parties most likely prefer the
production of metadata in its unadulterated form as opposed
to TIFF image files because image files take significantly
longer to sift through, as they are not ordinarily text
searchable.
Contrary to Impax Laboratories, the court in In re
Verisign, Inc. Securities Litigation resolved that the
production of the TIFF image files alone was not sufficient to
fulfill the production order, and the electronic version must
include not only include metadata but must also be
searchable.71 Additionally, the court in Hagenbush v. 3B6
Sistemi Elettronici Industriali held that the party requesting
production of documents was entitled to identical copies in
the same form in which 3B6 USA kept them in the usual
course of business.72
Generally, a company that produces ESI for inspection
pursuant to Rule 34 must produce the ESI as it is kept in the
usual course of business.73 The company, however, should
organize and label the ESI in accordance with the categories
in the request for production, if the request so states.74 This
indicates that the company will usually have to produce, to
the best of their ability, ESI in its native, unaltered format.
As case law appears to imply, the best practice for a
company to ensure compliance with respect to the format of
69. Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006).
70. Id.
71. In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2004) (requiring that the documents be in electronic
format is not contrary to law but is supported by the Federal Rules).
72. Hagenbush v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali, No. 04 C 3109, 2006
WL 665005, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006). After the plaintiff had complied with
the defendant’s request to visit their facility to designate which documents to be
produced, the plaintiff is entitled not to TIFF image files of the documents
requested but to identical electronic copies as viewed at the defendant’s facility.
Id. at *1–2.
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
74. Id.
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their produced data is to adhere to the viewability rule
adopted by the Williams court. In abiding by this rule, the
court maintained that all metadata that is ordinarily visible
to the user of a spreadsheet application should presumptively
be treated as part of the document and should, thus, be
discoverable.75 In light of the viewability rule, the company
should include a provision in its service agreement to
guarantee that their third-party cloud computing service
provider will undertake the following prescriptive and
prospective measures; preserve visible metadata on ESI, flag
ESI containing metadata to facilitate future searches for ESI
containing metadata, and refrain from scrubbing metadata
away. Therein, once the company anticipates litigation, it
can quickly determine which documents would require the
additional production of metadata—provided that the
metadata has been stored in the first instance, and that it is
either visible or specifically requested.
Yet, to further complicate matters, data that is stored in
random access memory (RAM) may also be subject to
production due to Rule 34(a)’s intention that the scope of the
production of documents be as broad as possible.76 In
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, the court determined that
defendants operating a torrent file search website must
produce RAM to the plaintiff motion picture studio.77 Rule
34(a)(1),78 as amended in 2006, encompasses data stored in
any medium from which information can be obtained and
does not include a carve out for information written to a
medium that stores information only temporarily, such as
RAM.79 Moreover, the advisory committee’s notes to the 2006
amendments to the FRCP express that Rule 34(a)(1) “is
intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of
computer-based information, and flexible enough to
encompass future changes and developments.”80
In the wake of Bunnell, a company must be prepared to
not only produce metadata, but also RAM related to ESI

75.
2005).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 652 (D. Kan.
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 447 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
See id. at 445–46.
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
Columbia Pictures, Inc., 245 F.R.D. at 447.
Advisory Comm. on 2006 amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
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stored by their third-party cloud computing service provider if
a requesting party specifies as such. It is therefore advisable
that a company contracting with a third-party cloud
computing service provider include provisions in their service
agreement that specify for the continued maintenance and
retention of both metadata and RAM for applicable files,
especially after a litigation hold has been put in place.
Otherwise, the company faces potential spoliation sanctions
for the deletion of this desired data. With this protective
provision serving as one of the terms of the service
agreement, a company subjected to sanctions for spoliation of
metadata and/or RAM, at the very least, may allege that the
third-party cloud computing service provider committed a
breach of contract in a subsequent claim against the offending
provider.
iv. Control of ESI
A company that stores its data with a third-party cloud
service provider need only produce ESI that is under the
company’s possession, custody, or control.81 However, control
of ESI does not require that the party have legal ownership or
actual possession of the documents at issue.82 Rather,
documents may be considered to fall under a party’s control
when that party has the right, authority, or practical ability
to obtain the documents from a non-party to the action.83
This is particularly applicable when a company employs a
third-party cloud computing service provider to store its data.
In practice, courts have interpreted Rule 34 “to require
production if the party has the practical ability to obtain the
documents from another, irrespective of his legal entitlement
to the documents.”84
While the practical ability test, mentioned above, may be
useful in assessing a party’s obligations under Rule 34, the
control test is more useful in determining the control required
to trigger a party’s duty to preserve evidence.85 The control

81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
82. See In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
83. Id.
84. Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (emphasis added).
85. Goodman v. Praxair Services, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 516 n.11 (D.
Md. 2009).
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test was explicated by the court in In re NTL, Inc. Securities
Litigation, which stated that the “test for production of
documents is control, not location . . . where the documents
are considered to be under a party’s control when that party
has the right, authority or practical ability to obtain the
documents from a non-party to the action.”86
Application of the control test to documents held by a
third-party occurred in Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., whereby
the plaintiff sought to compel the production of records from a
company controlling a pension plan who in turn had retained
a third-party to maintain the electronic records associated
with the pension plan.87 The company was under a duty to
maintain certain records to comply with the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act88 and could not discharge
this duty by having a third-party maintain its records.89
Therefore, even though a third-party was maintaining the
company’s records, the court determined that the company
was still in possession, custody, or control of the documents
because they had or should have had the authority or ability
to obtain the requested data from the third-party.90
Similarly, the court in Flagg91 determined that the City
of Detroit had sufficient control of ESI to permit production
by its third-party service provider in the face of a subpoena.92
Sufficient control existed because the City possessed the
authority to consent to production of text messages stored by
its third-party service provider, SkyTel, in relation to the
alleged murder of the plaintiff’s mother.93 The City of Detroit
entered into a contract with SkyTel to provide the
municipality with text messaging devices and corresponding
services for various city officials.94 Because the City had the
ability to grant its consent to their third-party service
provider to obtain the records, it was considered to be in

86. In re NTL, Inc., 244 F.R.D. at 195.
87. Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., 245 F.R.D. 474, 476–77 (D. Colo. 2007).
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 1059(a)(1) (2010). Under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, an employer has the responsibility of the proper
maintenance and retention of employees’ pension and welfare plan records.
89. See Tomlinson, 245 F.R.D. at 477.
90. Id.
91. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
92. Id. at 354.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 347.
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control of the ESI, and the City could not simply refuse to
give consent and maintain that the records were out of their
control in a Rule 34 context.95 The court in Flagg proceeded
with its analysis under the assumption that the request for
production of the text messages came under a Rule 34 motion
to compel.96 The court thereby required the plaintiff to
reformulate its discovery request from a Rule 45 subpoena97
of SkyTel to a Rule 34 motion to compel98 upon the City of
Detroit to avoid complications under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).99
Dietrich v. Bauer100 exemplified another instance in
which a party to litigation was determined to be in control of
information that was maintained by a third-party. In this
case, a parent company exercised sufficient control over the
documents of its subsidiary to render it responsible for
producing the requested documents.101 Likewise, those who
engage in joint ventures have a legal right to obtain
information from his or her fellow venturer upon demand for
production of documents.102 With respect to data held by a
former employee, the court in Export-Import Bank of the
United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co.103 found that the
plaintiff-bank fulfilled the control test, because it had the
apparent practical ability to obtain requested documents from
its non-party former employee.104 Alternatively, at the very
least, the bank was compelled to ask its former employee for
the documents before asserting that it had no control over the
documents in the former employee’s possession.105
95. Id. at 355.
96. Id. at 366.
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(D).
99. Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 366. The court determined that it was unclear
whether under the ECPA SkyTel’s records would be protected and not be
subject to a Rule 45 subpoena for records. See id.
100. Dietrich v. Bauer, 95 Civ. 7051 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11729
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000).
101. Id. at *9.
102. Starlight Int’l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 635 (D. Kan. 1999)
(stating that joint venturers have the right, authority or practical ability to
produce documents that are held by a member of the joint venture because a
joint venture is treated as a partnership in Kansas).
103. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper, 233 F.R.D. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
104. Id. at 341.
105. Id.
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Further, the court in Tetra Technologies, Inc. v. Hamilton
found that the defendant, a subscriber/user of a cell phone
service, had sufficient control over his personal cell phone
records to be obligated to produce them in the face of a Rule
34 motion to compel. The defendant fulfilled the control test,
because he possessed the legal right to obtain the phone
records, which were requested by the plaintiff.106 Again, in
Cyntegra, Inc. v. Idexx Laboratories, Inc., the court found that
the defendant-company satisfied the control test and
consequently sanctioned the company for failing to make
payments to its third-party data storage company, who in
turn deleted the discoverable data from its servers as a result
of this non-payment.107
As the cases above explicate, a company that employs a
third-party cloud computing service provider to retain data
will be deemed by a court to be in control of the data
maintained by the service provider for production and
preservation purposes.108 Even though the ESI is not within
the company’s possession, the ESI is still within the
company’s control, because the company has the legal right to
obtain it.109
Few courts have commented specifically on discovery
obligations within the context of cloud computing,110 but
situations in which possession and control are similarly split
between a party to the litigation and a third-party service
provider, provide helpful analogies.111 Although the company
has legal control of the ESI in the eyes of the court, the thirdparty cloud computing service provider may refuse to retrieve
the ESI in the proper format; respecting that the company
needs to produce the ESI in the explicit and precise format in
106. Tetra Techs., Inc. v. Hamilton, No. CIV-07-1186-M, 2008 WL 3307150,
at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 7, 2008).
107. Cyntegra, Inc. v. Idexx Labs., Inc., No. CV 06-4170 PSG (CTx), 2007 WL
5193736, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007).
108. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 354 (E.D. Mich. 2008); In re
NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Tomlinson v. El Paso
Corp., 245 F.R.D. 474, 477 (D. Colo. 2007).
109. See generally supra note 95 and accompanying text.
110. Similarly, few courts have even mentioned cloud computing in there
opinions except for one. See Oregon v. Beller, 217 P.3d 1094, 1111 n.11 (Or. Ct.
App. 2009) (Sercombe, J., dissenting).
111. Charles B. Molster III & Elizabeth H. Erickson, “Cloud Computing” in
Discovery: How We Deal with Electronically Stored Information, 59 VA. LAW. 60,
60 n.1 (2010).
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order to comply with the opposing party’s discovery request.
A company may avoid the problems brought by the lack
of guidance regarding discovery obligations and cloud
computing by adding a stipulation in its service contract with
the third-party cloud computing service provider.
The
contract term may allow the company, at the discretion of the
company’s general counsel or a specified officer, to obtain ESI
in the event of anticipated litigation within a specified
window of time. Whether non-parties to litigation—such as
third-party cloud computing service providers—may hide
behind the shield of the ECPA when subpoenaed by the
opposing party to produce ESI is still unclear.112
2. Mitigating Liability Under Prong II of the Zubulake
IV Framework
The second element of the Zubulake IV framework
requires that a party to destroy evidence with a culpable state
of mind in order for the imposition of sanctions for the
violation of the duty to preserve.113 A company employing a
third-party cloud computing service provider may address the
culpability requirement by being proactive when drafting the
service agreement and tailoring it to the applicable
jurisdiction’s case law so that both parties acknowledge and
are informed of the relevant culpability standard. Potential
sanctions on a scale of most to least severe include: dismissal
of a claim or granting judgment in favor of a prejudiced party,
suppression of evidence, an adverse inference, fines, and
attorneys’ fees and costs.114
Even though federal law governs the instant sanctioning
process for spoliation of evidence, as the sanctions constitute
evidentiary matters,115 the extent of culpability required to
incur sanctions varies from circuit to circuit. The range of
culpability for destruction of ESI includes bad faith, gross

112. See Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 366.
113. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). The level of culpability is of prime importance in the court’s
determination of the appropriate sanction. See Crist, supra note 36, at 45.
114. Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335
(D.N.J. 2004).
115. Se. Mech. Serv., Inc. v. Brody, No.: 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69830, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009) (citing Flury v. Daimler
Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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negligence, and ordinary negligence.116 Yet, once the duty to
preserve attaches to discoverable ESI, “any destruction of
documents is, at a minimum, negligent.”117 When a party
seeks a sanction that would terminate litigation, such as a
request for dismissal or default judgment, the circuits
uniformly require a showing of bad faith.118 An adverse
inference is an instruction to the jury that there is a
rebuttable presumption that the lost evidence is both relevant
and favorable to the questing party’s claims or defenses.119
The showing of culpability required for an adverse inference
instruction varies by circuit court.120
A reflection of the fragmentation among the circuit courts
begins with the lowest level of culpability necessary for the
imposition of sanctions, whereby a court, within the Second
Circuit, in Pension Comm. of the University of Montreal v.
Banc of America Securities, LLC, imposed an adverse
inference after finding that the defendant had destroyed ESI
in a manner amounting to gross negligence.121 The Second
Circuit further allows for the imposition of an adverse
inference based on negligent destruction alone.122 In the
First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, bad faith is not essential
for imposing an adverse inference as long as there is severe
prejudice—although the presence of bad faith is often
emphasized.123
The Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C.

116. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 11 n.52.
117. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220.
118. Crist, supra note 36, at 45.
119. Pension Comm. of Montreal Univ. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
120. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 11 n.59.
121. See Pension Comm. of Montreal Univ., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
122. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d
Cir. 2002) (stating that “[t]he sanction of an adverse inference may be
appropriate in some cases involving negligent destruction of evidence because
each party should bear the risk of its own negligence”).
123. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir.
2001) (holding that dismissal is usually justified only in circumstances of bad
faith but even where conduct is less culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the
prejudice to the other party is extraordinary); Sacramona v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Certainly bad
faith is a proper and important consideration in deciding whether and how to
sanction conduct resulting in the destruction of evidence. But bad faith is not
essential.”); Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that
a trial court has broad discretionary power to permit a jury to draw an adverse
inference from the spoliation against the party responsible for such behavior).
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Circuits impose an adverse inference only after finding bad
Likewise, in Rimkus Consulting Group v.
faith.124
Cammarata, a decision rendered within the Eleventh Circuit,
the court required a showing of bad faith to impose an
adverse inference.125 The Third Circuit follows a more unique
approach by balancing the degrees of fault and prejudice to
determine the culpability of the spoliating party and the
appropriate sanctions.126
Regardless of the level of culpability that applies, an
enterprise employing a cloud computing service provider has
a safe harbor from the imposition of sanctions. An enterprise
may employ this safe harbor, under Rule 37(e), if their cloud
computing service provider routinely destroys data in “goodfaith.”127 More specifically, under Rule 37(e), sanctions are
inappropriate (1) where electronic communications are
destroyed pursuant to a computer system’s routine
operations, and (2) where there is no evidence that the system
was operated in bad faith.128 Regardless, once litigation is
anticipated, as discussed in Part I.B.1.i, the company
certainly should instruct its third-party cloud computing
service provider to disable all routine destruction policies and
place a litigation hold on their relevant ESI.129

124. See, e.g., Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th
Cir. 2009) (“Mere negligence in losing or destroying records is not enough . . . .”)
(quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997)); Faas v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that in order to
draw an adverse inference, “we must find that Sears intentionally destroyed the
documents in bad faith.”); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035
(8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a spoliation of evidence sanction requires a finding
of intentional destruction).
125. Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614 (S.D.
Tex. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit also requires bad faith for an adverse
inference. See Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1294
(11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n adverse inference is drawn from a party’s failure to
preserve evidence only when the absence of that evidence is predicated on bad
faith.”) (quoting Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997)).
126. See Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335
(D.N.J. 2004) (noting that “three key considerations dictate whether sanctions
are warranted: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the
evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3)
whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness . . .”).
127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
128. Se. Mech. Serv., Inc. v. Brody, No.: 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69830, at *13 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009).
129. See, e.g., Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007) (imposing
sanctions for failure to turn off an automatic deletion feature once informed of
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As discussed earlier, the level of culpability that will
warrant the imposition of sanctions varies among the circuit
courts, especially for the imposition of an adverse inference.
Still, once the duty to preserve attaches, “any destruction of
documents is, at a minimum, negligent.”130 Therefore, an
enterprise employing a third-party cloud computing service
provider must draft their service agreement in such a fashion,
where once a litigation hold is triggered the routine
destruction of ESI is immediately disabled. The enterprise
should also make reasonable efforts to become knowledgeable
and stay informed of which circuit’s culpability jurisprudence
is applicable when drafting their service agreement.
More specifically, it is strongly advised that the
enterprise negotiate in an indemnity provision commensurate
with the most current case law in the jurisdiction that applies
to the service agreement. The indemnity provision should
include some flexibility that anticipates the possibility for
case law in the corresponding jurisdiction to become stricter
with regards to their interpretation of the second element of
the Zubulake IV framework.
3. Mitigating Liability Under Prong III of the Zubulake
IV Framework
The third and final element of the Zubulake IV
framework requires that “the destroyed evidence was
relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that
claim or defense” before sanctions may be imposed by the
court for failure to preserve ESI.131 “Relevant” in this context
is defined as something more than sufficiently probative132 to
pending litigation without finding bad faith); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’n
Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 511–12 (D. Md. 2005) (finding that Echostar had engaged
in gross spoliation because it had failed to suspend its email and data
destruction policy once litigation was reasonably anticipated); Rambus, Inc. v.
Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 282 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[O]nce a party
reasonably anticipates litigation, it has a duty to suspend any routine document
purging system that might be in effect and to put in place a litigation hold to
ensure the preservation of relevant document—failure to do so constitutes
spoliation.”).
130. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
131. Id.
132. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d
Cir. 2002).
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satisfy Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.133 If ESI is
destroyed in bad faith, either intentionally or willfully, this
fact alone is enough to establish relevance.134 In the absence
of bad faith, however, this element must be established by the
submission of extrinsic evidence demonstrating the absent
evidence would have been favorable to the party seeking
sanctions.135
In terms of approaching this third prong, the best
practice for a company anticipating litigation is to produce
ESI that is relevant within the context of Rule 401 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, whereby the ESI must be more
than sufficiently probative.136 If ESI does not meet the Rule
401 threshold, the company should use its best judgment in
withholding the ESI. If the ESI is not destroyed in bad faith,
the third prong of the Zubulake IV framework appears to be
more preferential to the producing party rather than the
requesting party, or the party seeking to impose sanctions, as
it places a fairly heightened burden of proof upon the latter to
locate and provide extrinsic evidence with a tendency to show
that the missing evidence would have been favorable to its
position.
III. PROACTIVE MEASURES TO LESSEN THE RISK OF SANCTIONS
FOR SPOLIATION OF ESI
In today’s business environment, companies are
outsourcing more of their data services, both data storage and
processing, which is leading to the emergence and rapid
adoption of cloud computing solutions that entail third-party
administration and control of basic technology services.137 In
light of this new method of storing ESI, companies must
make additional efforts to reduce the risk of court sanctions
and liability by drafting advantageous provisions in service
agreements with a third-party cloud computing service
provider in contemplation of prospective litigation and lack of

133. FED. R. EVID. 401.
134. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220.
135. Chan v. Triple 8 Palace, Inc., 03 Civ. 6048 (GEL) (JCF), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16520, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005).
136. Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 108.
137. See Renee T. Lawson, Cloud Computing and IT Outsourcing Unforeseen Hiccups for E-Discovery in the Wake of Quon v. Arch Wireless?, 832
PLI/LIT 203, 212–13 (2010).
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cooperation by the service provider. A company may be
subject to liability if its third-party cloud computing service
provider’s actions relating to the company’s ESI, which
includes their non-compliance with a request to produce ESI
because, as case law has demonstrated (e.g., the commonly
used control test from In re NTL, Inc.) the company holds
control over its ESI even if the company does not have
possession of the ESI.138 The company therefore needs to
implement a provision in the service agreement with its
third-party cloud computing service provider, which enables
one of the company’s agents, such as the general counsel or a
specified corporate officer, to demand that ESI be handed
over to the company within a short period of time.
The company must also have the ability to quickly place
a litigation hold on specified relevant ESI, and to direct its
third-party service provider to disable routine deletion
procedures to stave off spoliation sanctions. Further, in the
event of a Rule 34 request for ESI, provisions must be
incorporated into the service agreement whereby the cloud
computing service provider can produce metadata and, also,
RAM, if necessary.
A contractual provision should
additionally be added to the company’s service agreement,
whereby, in the event that the third-party cloud computing
service provider is subpoenaed, the company’s counsel will
receive a notice of all subpoenas that concern the company’s
ESI as well as a right of first refusal over the service
provider’s production of the company’s ESI.
The service agreement should also address which party
incurs liability for sanctions stemming from any spoliation of
the company’s ESI. An indemnification clause in the service
agreement could provide indemnification for the company
from the third-party cloud computing service provider for all
sanctions resulting from the service provider’s destruction of
relevant ESI after the company has put a litigation hold on
such relevant ESI. In addition to contractual provisions, the
company should apprise the judge in a Rule 26 discovery
conference that the company’s relevant ESI will need to be
obtained from its third-party cloud computing service
provider. In doing so, the judge will be able to take into
account the additional complications inherent in first
138. See In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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obtaining ESI from a third-party for production in the
discovery plan and also be subject to the court’s order.
Finally, an enterprise engaged in litigation should
consider the creation of a private network on the contracted
third-party cloud computing service provider’s system. Such
a system would allow an opposing/moving party to directly
access the requested ESI. Not only would such a system
facilitate the requesting party’s access for the requested ESI
in its native format, it would also enable the producing party
to restrict access exclusively within the bounds of discovery.
Such a mechanism benefits both the requesting and
producing parties: on the one hand, it would allow the
requesting party access to what they precisely seek and, on
the other, reassure the producing party that the ESI
produced is only the ESI responsive to the discovery request
and nothing more is at risk of being inadvertently disclosed.
CONCLUSION
As the shift towards the usage of third-party cloud
computing service providers continues to grow, a company
employing these services must adjust to the many facets and
challenges that electronic discovery will potentially pose. A
company itself holds the burden of drafting a service
agreement that provides protection from liability for the
spoliation of ESI by third-party cloud computing service
providers. Sanctions for the spoliation of ESI are costly and
can be crippling to litigation, as described supra with
reference to adverse inferences.139 To prevent this foreseeable
consequence, it is strongly recommended that a company—in
drafting their third-party cloud computing service
agreement—integrate
provisions
that
call
for the
implementation of litigation holds ceasing routine spoliation
procedures when the enterprise anticipates litigation.
Provisions that clearly establish whose ESI will be retained,
the scope of ESI to be retained, in what form, and how it will
be retained are also helpful in providing clear delineations of
liability. By taking the proactive steps discussed in this
Comment towards insulating itself from potential discovery

139. See Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335
(D.N.J. 2004) (explicating potential sanctions on a continuum of most to least
severe); infra Part I.B.2.
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sanctions, a company may more comfortably allow its data to
“enter the cloud.”

